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National Culture and Capital Structure Decisions: 
Evidence from Foreign Joint Ventures in China 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the role of firms’ country of origin in financial leverage decisions using data on foreign 
joint ventures in China. We hypothesize that national culture enters the joint optimization process leading 
to foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions and that it affects leverage decisions both directly and 
indirectly. Using cultural values of mastery and embeddedness to explain country of origin effects, we 
find that mastery has negative and significant direct effects on foreign joint ventures’ leverage and short-
term debt decisions, and a positive and significant direct effect on the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ 
having long-term debt. The indirect effects of mastery on leverage decisions sometimes reinforce and 
sometimes offset the direct effects. Embeddedness has no significant direct effect on foreign joint 
ventures’ leverage decisions, but exerts its influence entirely through indirect effects. Finally, the 
economic significance analysis of the total effects suggests that national culture has significant 
explanatory power in the leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. 
 
Keywords: country of origin; cultural values; embeddedness; foreign direct investments; leverage; 
mastery   
JEL Classification: G15 International Financial Markets; G32 Financing Policies
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Are capital structure decisions affected by a firm’s country of origin? Standard finance theories suggest 
that financing decisions should be determined only by economic considerations such as profit 
maximization and transactions costs. Cultural theorists, in contrast, have suggested that cultural 
background may have inescapable influences on decisions of every kind, including capital structure 
decisions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta, 2004). Indeed, Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok (2002) 
identify cross-country differences in the capital structure decisions of domestic firms that are consistent 
with the predictions of cultural theories, and find that these differences remain significant even when 
firm- and country-level factors are accounted for. 
In this paper, we extend studies of cultural influences on corporate decisions to the setting of 
foreign joint ventures in China. Our work contributes to the growing literature on the interaction between 
culture and economic outcomes (See Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006 for an excellent survey) in 
several important ways. First, we provide a novel demonstration of how informal institutions from within 
a country such as culture can affect capital structure decisions of foreign joint ventures outside that 
country. Second, we link the effects of culture to other corporate decisions, such as the choices of firm 
size and industry affiliation, and demonstrate that culture affects leverage decisions both directly and 
indirectly. Our investigation of the indirect effects of culture is new to the literature.  Finally, we employ 
a hierarchical linear model to separate the variance in foreign joint ventures’ firm-level leverage decisions 
explained by the foreign joint venture firm- versus country-level variables. 
Why should country of origin matter in the capital structure decisions of foreign joint ventures in 
China? North (1993) argues that individuals embody the informal institutional constraints of their culture 
of origin as reflected in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. We extend this logic to corporate 
decision making. When a foreign company enters into China and faces a totally different cultural and 
institutional setting from that of their home country, they may maintain the informal institutional 
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constraints of their home country. Thus, foreign joint ventures in China allow us to study the portability 
of culture in corporate decisions. 
Financial decision-making inevitably involves trade-offs, and some of these are related to cultural 
values. For example, debt financing provides a source of capital and interest tax shields, but also reduces 
the independence of the firm, increases the likelihood of financial distress, and may put a firm in great 
financial uncertainty. Cultural values may affect the way that foreign joint ventures perceive and weigh 
the benefits and costs associated with debt financing, and hence affects their capital structure decisions. 
This implies that foreign joint ventures from different cultural backgrounds will differ in their use of debt 
financing. 
Using cultural values developed by Schwartz (2004), we test whether between country 
differences in the cultural values of mastery (versus harmony) and embeddedness (versus autonomy) 
affect corporate financing decisions in a foreign subsidiary environment. 
Cultures high on mastery emphasize the importance of controlling the natural and social 
environment to attain goals, whereas cultures low on mastery emphasize a harmonious fit to the world as 
is. Cultures high on embeddedness emphasize the importance of tradition and the role of an individual’s 
responsibility and relationship to the shared group goal, while cultures low on embeddedness emphasize 
an individual’s self-directedness and autonomy from the larger society. We expect that there is a cultural 
effect on foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions; however, the direction of that effect is ultimately an 
empirical question. Furthermore, we expect cultural values to affect leverage decisions both directly and 
indirectly via choices of firm size, industry concentration and affiliation, and region of investment. 
Using foreign joint ventures in China’s manufacturing sector, we find that mastery is negatively 
and significantly associated with foreign joint ventures’ leverage and short-term debt decisions, and is 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt. 
We find no direct effect of embeddedness on any measures of leverage, though we do find evidence of 
indirect effects linking cultural values to choices of firm characteristics, industry concentration and 
affiliation, and investment location. The direct and indirect effects of mastery on leverage are sometimes 
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consistent in sign and reinforcing, and are sometimes opposite in sign and offsetting. Embeddedness 
exerts its influence entirely through indirect effects. Finally, we demonstrate that the direct and indirect 
influences of cultural values in foreign joint ventures’ home countries are of economic importance even 
after controlling for formal institutions in their home countries and firm characteristics. Thus, our study 
provides clear evidence regarding the importance of informal institutions such as culture in corporate 
finance decisions, and thus complements the literature on formal institutions and finance (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review the related literature and explore 
the potential role of cultural values in foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions in the next section. 
Section 3 discusses the sample and variable construction. Section 4 describes the empirical models. 
Section 5 presents our main results and provides some interpretation. Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CULTURAL VALUES AND LEVERAGE 
 
Prior Literature 
Our study is related to two strands of literature: the literature on capital structure decisions in an 
international setting, and the literature on the role of culture in finance.  
The theory of optimal capital structure suggests that financing decisions require trade-offs among 
at least five elements: (1) tax benefits of debt financing, (2) costs of financial distress, (3) agency costs of 
debt, (4) agency costs of equity, and (5) signaling effects of security issuance (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1980, 1981; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
Haugen and Senbet, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Chaplinsky and Harris, 1996). Prior work by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), La Porta et al. (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001), Bancel and Mittoo (2004), Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) and 
Fan, Titman, and Twite (2008) using international data shows that firm characteristics (e.g. size and 
profitability) that capture the trade-off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs are still important 
determinants of local firms’ capital structure decisions. Further, a country’s development of its legal and 
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institutional framework mitigates the existence of asymmetric information and agency costs. When the 
legal system is inefficient or costly to use, short-term debt is more likely to be employed than long-term 
debt (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2008).  
Our study focuses on debt financing of non-publicly traded firms, while past research on capital 
structure choices in developing countries has mainly focused on the largest public firms in those countries 
(Giannetti, 2003, and Li, Yue, and Zhao, 2009 are notable exceptions). Large listed companies have 
easier access to both domestic and international financial markets than their non-listed counterparts, and 
as a result their capital structure decisions are less subject to the institutional constraints imposed by their 
home countries. Our sample of non-publicly traded foreign joint ventures provides a context to more 
clearly reveal the role of home country influences in corporate leverage decisions.  
The concept of culture has been used previously to help explain international investment and 
corporate decisions. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that investor stock trading decisions are 
affected by culture as proxied by common language and cultural background. Pagano, Röell, and Zechner 
(2002) and Sarkissian and Schill (2004) present evidence showing that cross-listing firms seek 
prospective investors in culturally proximate markets to ensure the smooth flow of information between 
home and destination markets.  Shao, Kwok, and Guedhami (2009) find that there is a positive relation 
between embeddedness and dividend payouts, and a negative relation between mastery and dividend 
payouts.  Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2008, 2010) show that cross-country investment flows of equity, 
debt, mergers and acquisitions, and foreign direct investments are greatest when countries match on the 
cultural dimension of egalitarianism. Li, Griffin, Yue, and Zhao (2010) find that there is significant 
association between the national culture of corporate managers and their risk taking. Finally, Chui, 
Titman, and Wei (2009) suggest that individualism is positively associated with overconfidence and self-
attribution bias, and show that individualism is strongly correlated with the magnitude of momentum 
profits. 
Our work is most closely related to Chui et al. (2002) who demonstrate that domestic firms in 
countries with high scores on the cultural values of mastery and embeddedness have lower corporate debt 
ratios. They regress country-level corporate debt ratios on mastery and embeddedness and show that both 
values are negatively associated with debt ratios. They also regress firm-level debt ratios on the two 
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cultural values; both values are still negatively associated with leverage, although the adjusted R
2
 falls 
from 44% to less than 6%. Their results are robust after controlling for industry effects and differences in 
legal systems and economic development. 
Different from their work, we focus on the leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China 
to test the portability of national cultures in a setting where foreign joint ventures operate and make 
corporate decisions outside their home countries. Further, we apply a novel empirical methodology that 
accounts for the hierarchical structure of our data. This empirical specification allows us to decompose 
the association between firm characteristics and leverage, as well as regional characteristics and leverage, 
into country-level and individual firm-level components. We then identify important indirect effects of 
culture on leverage and assess the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects. Finally, our 
analysis takes an important additional step—explaining not only the level of leverage as examined by 
Chui et al. (2002), but also the maturity structure of debt using cultural values. 
 
Our Conceptual Framework 
How might cultural values affect corporate financing decisions? Figure 1 presents our conceptual 
framework describing the role of culture in the joint optimization process leading to leverage decisions 
that we focus on in this paper.  
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
Variables that operate at the national culture level are assumed to affect all foreign joint venture 
managers from the same country (House et al., 2004). Fundamental causes for these cultural differences 
include shared history, geography, and economic conditions (Hofstede, 2001). Stulz and Williamson 
(2003), and Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007) demonstrate that culture, in turn, influences formal 
institutions such as rule of law and investor protection (see path (1) in Figure 1). Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998, 1999), Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) and others have 
established the strong association between formal institutions of a country and capital structure decisions 
of its domestic firms (see path (2)). Building on Chui et al. (2002), we hypothesize that the cultural values 
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of foreign joint venture managers affect the joint optimization process leading to leverage decisions even 
when their home country formal institutions are controlled for (see path (3)). In addition to country-level 
influences as discussed above, there are firm-level constraints that enter into the joint optimization 
process such as the pre-existing strategies and focus of foreign joint ventures’ parent companies, and the 
demand for certain industrial/consumer products (see path (4)).
2
   
In the context of the joint optimization process involving capital structure, investment, control, 
and governance, foreign joint venture managers must make trade-offs among these outcome variables 
subject to a number of restrictions including institutions, capital availability, and the production process 
(see path (5)). For example, a Swedish telecommunications manufacturer may require a certain number of 
cellular phone cases from China, and the firm’s international scope of operations allows access to certain 
financing arrangements. As a result, the joint optimization process of its subsidiary in China may be 
subject to specific pre-existing constraints including the formal institutions in Sweden, funding 
availability, the size of the foreign joint venture, and its industry affiliation. For any given financing 
decision, other variables such as size and industry affiliation could be either pre-determined as 
conditioning variables (as in the example above) or could be choice variables of foreign joint venture 
managers in the joint optimization process.  
How does culture enter this process? Culture affects the perceived benefits and costs of having 
debt (see path (6)) as well as the choices of other variables entering into the joint optimization process 
(see paths (3) and (5)). In the model presented in Figure 1, foreign joint ventures’ financing decisions are 
made conditional on certain firm characteristics such as size, profitability, industry concentration, and 
regional environment (see path (7)). In such cases we can distinguish the direct effects of culture, which is 
the relation between cultural values and leverage decisions holding constant other variables present in the 
joint optimization process (see path (6)), from the indirect effects of culture, which includes the 
influences of culture on other variables present in the joint optimization process such as firm 
characteristics and regional environment (see paths (3), (5), and (7)). The total effects of culture on 
                                                 
2
 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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leverage decisions is the sum of the direct and indirect effects (see paths (6) and (7), respectively). Later 
in our empirical analysis we try to assess the relative importance of the direct and indirect effects of 
culture. 
 
Cultural Values and Leverage Decisions 
Following the conceptual framework presented in Figure 1, we distinguish between country-level 
and firm-level determinants of foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions. Our main proposition is that one 
important country-level determinant of capital structure decisions for foreign joint ventures in China is the 
national culture of the foreign joint venture’s home country, which operates both directly on the choice of 
leverage and indirectly through the selection of the other variables during the joint optimization process.  
For our measure of cultural values, we use the Schwartz Value Survey instrument (Schwartz, 
2004). Following Chui et al. (2002), we focus on mastery and embeddedness. Figure 2 outlines our 
thought experiment regarding their potential (directional) effects on foreign joint ventures’ leverage 
decisions.
3
 As noted before, the theory of optimal capital structure spans at least five perspectives. In our 
particular setting, we exclude tax benefits of debt financing and signaling effects of security issuance, as 
we do not expect cultural variation on leverage responses to tax rate and security issuance given that all 
foreign joint ventures in our sample are not publicly-traded, and hence have no access to public debt or 
equity markets.  
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
The cultural value of mastery may affect foreign joint ventures’ capital structure decisions, as it 
encourages exerting control over one’s environment and emphasizes individual success. This could 
                                                 
3
 In this paper, we assume that a foreign joint venture manager makes decisions that reflect the cultural values of the 
foreign joint venture’s home country even if the foreign joint venture manager is not from the same culture. 
Hofstede (1985) maintains that in many cases, the corporate culture of a firm reflects the cultural values of its home 
country, which in turn affects the decisions of managers (even foreign managers). To the extent that foreign joint 
venture managers do not reflect the cultural values of their firm’s home country, this would add noise to our 
empirical analysis and bias our results against finding any effect of culture on foreign joint ventures’ leverage 
decisions. 
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moderate foreign joint venture managers’ perception of benefits and costs associated with debt financing 
in terms of the remaining three perspectives on optimal capital structure. First, in terms of the costs of 
financial distress, which could be small economically in a well functioning system (Haugen and Senbet, 
1978), high mastery managers who focus on personal success will be concerned about the loss of control 
associated with bankruptcy (see path (1) in Figure 2). The focus on personal success associated with high 
mastery exacerbates the costs of financial distress, and hence leads to reduced use of debt. We view the 
focus on personal success by high mastery managers as an individual attribute that is not influenced by 
the social context, and thus this concern for personal success is highly relevant in our foreign joint venture 
setting. Second, in terms of the agency costs of debt, high mastery managers dislike loss of control due to 
debt monitoring, and so avoid debt to reduce the discipline and constraints that it imposes (see path (2)).
4
 
The focus on maintaining control associated with high mastery magnifies the agency costs of debt, and 
hence leads to reduced use of debt. This tendency is highly relevant in our foreign joint venture setting. 
Third, in terms of the agency costs of equity, high mastery managers value control and therefore may seek 
debt financing to allow them to achieve a high level of ownership with minimum own equity (see path (3), 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The focus on seeking control associated with high mastery magnifies the 
agency costs of equity, and hence leads to increased use of debt. In summary, two of the three 
perspectives on optimal capital structure provide support for a negative association between mastery and 
the use of debt, while the third perspective suggests the opposite. The directional association between 
mastery and foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions is therefore ultimately an empirical question. 
Note that total debt (leverage) is the sum of short-term and long-term debt. From the perspective 
of lenders, lending on a long-term basis is more risky because of greater information asymmetries and 
asset-substitution possibilities in the long-run. Thus, lenders monitor borrowers more intensively when 
they lend long-term and also place direct constraints on managers through the inclusion of more detailed 
covenants. On the other hand, while short-term debt’s shorter maturity and need to roll-over periodically 
                                                 
4
 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight on high mastery. 
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effectively places constraints on managers, it also has fewer covenants. A priori, it is not clear whether 
high mastery managers perceive long-term or short-term debt as placing more constraints on themselves.
5
  
Given that high mastery managers avoid loss of control, we expect that they would avoid 
whichever source of debt financing they find more constraining. Following this logic, in our empirical 
investigation we examine the directional association between mastery and long-term debt (short-term 
debt), and conclude that whichever type of debt is negatively associated with mastery is perceived to be 
more constraining. Thus, the sign of the coefficient on mastery in the regression of long-term debt (short-
term debt) is diagnostic of which type of debt is perceived to be more constraining.  For example, if the 
only negative and significant association is between mastery and short-term debt, we would infer that the 
particular financing hierarchy for high mastery managers is as follows: equity first, long-term debt next, 
and short-term debt last.  
The cultural value of embeddedness describes cultures in which a person is looked upon as an 
entity embedded in the collectivity. Emphasis is given to maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and 
restraint of actions that might disrupt the solidarity of a group or the existing order. The polar opposite of 
embeddedness is autonomy, where a person is encouraged to express his own preferences with minimum 
constraints.  
The cultural value of embeddedness may affect foreign joint ventures’ capital structure decisions, 
as it makes managers more sensitive to interpersonal relationships and to the costs of ―losing face.‖ First, 
in terms of the costs of financial distress, high embeddedness managers care about harmonious working 
relationships with employees, customers, and suppliers, and are motivated to avoid ―loss of face‖ when a 
debt financed venture fails (see path (4), Titman, 1984). The focus on harmony associated with high 
embeddedness exacerbates the costs of financial distress, and hence leads to reduced use of debt.  
However, we view the concern for ―losing face‖ by high embeddedness managers as an attribute of the 
relationship between an individual and his social environment. The importance of the concern for ―losing 
face‖ varies across different social contexts, and is highest in the individual’s home country setting. Thus, 
                                                 
5
 We thank an anonymous referee for the above discussion. 
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this motivation may be weakened in the context of foreign joint ventures in China.  Second, in terms of 
the agency costs of debt, high embeddedness managers prefer security, conformity, and tradition, and 
hence avoid risky investments and risky debt financing (see path (5), Chui et al., 2002). The focus on 
security associated with high embeddedness mitigates the agency costs of debt, and hence leads to 
reduced use of debt. This tendency is highly relevant in our foreign joint venture setting. Third, in terms 
of the agency costs of equity, high embeddedness managers put group interests ahead of self interests. 
The board and shareholders are aware that high embeddedness managers are less prone to agency 
problems, and therefore do not require the disciplinary role of debt to reduce agency costs (see path (6), 
Jensen, 1986). In this case, high embeddedness mitigates the agency costs of equity. On the other hand, 
high embeddedness managers dislike autonomy and hence do not mind constraints of debt. Both 
influences are highly relevant to our foreign joint venture setting, and so a priori, it is not clear which one 
dominates. We expect that the directional association between embeddedness and foreign joint ventures’ 
leverage decisions is ultimately an empirical question. 
Finally, foreign joint ventures from countries with different cultural values are expected to make 
different financing decisions due to the indirect effects of culture. For example, foreign joint venture 
managers from a country with high scores on mastery will seek out environments where they have 
maximum personal control and minimum constraints. This implies the choice of smaller firms, less 
concentrated industries, and industries with lower leverage.  Further, the key characteristic of high 
embeddedness managers is to avoid risk (Chui et al., 2002), so we expect that foreign joint venture 
managers from a country with high scores on embeddedness will tend to make safer investments as 
characterized by larger firms, less concentrated industries, and a higher level of regional institutional 
development.
6
 In summary, we expect that indirect effects of culture influence foreign joint ventures’ 
leverage through their choices of firm characteristics, industry concentration and affiliation, and region of 
investment. 
 
                                                 
6
 We thank an anonymous referee for this insight on high embeddedness. 
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DATA AND SAMPLE OVERVIEW 
 
Our Sample 
Our primary data sources are the foreign joint venture data collected by the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) in 2002 and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers by the NBS.
7
 The first data set contains 
the level of foreign ownership at the time of the founding as well as the country of origin of the foreign 
joint venture. Close to 50% of our sample foreign joint ventures are from Hong Kong. To avoid 
ambiguity regarding the true country of origin behind foreign investments from Hong Kong, our sample 
excludes foreign joint ventures from Hong Kong.
8
 The second data set consists of all manufacturing firms 
in 30 2-digit SIC industries. We utilize 2003 firm financial information as our foreign ownership data is 
from 2002, and most of our multivariate analyses are implemented in lead-lag fashion. We drop 
observations with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales. To deal with outliers and the 
most severely mis-recorded data, we winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the 
distribution. 
In our context, foreign joint ventures in China face a common set of country-level formal 
institutional constraints, but vary in cultural values from their countries of origin. Hence, our data offer an 
opportunity to explore the portability of the influences of cultural values on corporate financial decisions 
in a common country-level environment.
9
 
 
Variable Construction 
                                                 
7
 Huang, Jin, and Qian (2008) employ the same foreign joint venture data set as we do to explore the role of 
ethnicity in foreign joint ventures and demonstrate that ethnic Chinese invested joint ventures do not outperform 
non-ethnic firms. 
8
 It is worth noting that excluding foreign joint ventures from Taiwan does not change our main results (results 
available upon request). 
9
 Fan, Wong, Zhang (2009) and Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009) show that in China there are significant province-level 
variations in institutional development. In our empirical specification, we control for differences in the level of 
institutional development across different regions.  
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We calculate a firm’s leverage ratio (LEV) as its total liabilities divided by total assets.10 We 
compute a firm’s short-term debt ratio (STD) as its short-term liabilities divided by total assets. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) indicate that firms in developing countries tend to employ more 
short-term than long-term financing. Finally, we also construct an indicator variable, the LTD dummy, set 
equal to one if the firm has long-term liabilities in a specific year, and zero otherwise.
11
 
We consider the following firm characteristics that are known to affect capital structure (Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009).
12
 Firm size is the log of 
annual sales in millions of RMB yuan. Profitability is earnings before tax divided by total assets (ROA), 
adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total fixed assets divided by total assets. Asset 
maturity is (current assets/total assets) × (current assets/cost of goods sold) + (fixed assets/total assets) × 
(fixed assets/depreciation) divided by 100. Industry median is the median leverage measure for firms with 
the same 2-digit SIC code. Industry concentration is the Herfindahl index using sales of domestic Chinese 
firms with the same 2-digit SIC code. All the firm-level explanatory variables are measured in the year 
before leverage decisions (i.e., 2002). 
Most foreign joint ventures in China are green field investments (Graham and Wada, 2001). The 
locational distribution of foreign joint ventures is highly uneven. The majority is located in four coastal 
provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Fujian, and Shanghai), while most of the rest are located in other coastal 
provinces. Of the residual, the majority is located in provinces immediately adjacent to the coastal 
provinces, therefore in our empirical specification we control for the developmental discrepancies across 
provinces in China. Our data on institutional development across provinces in China comes from Fan and 
                                                 
10
 The NBS started to provide information on accounts payable in 2005. We find that for a subset of our sample with 
available information on accounts payable, more than half of their short-term debt comes from short-term bank loans. 
The correlation between short-term debt and short-term debt excluding accounts payable is 0.755 for firms covered 
in the 2005 data, and 0.656 for our foreign joint venture subsample. 
11
 The reason we employ a binary variable to capture firms’ long-term leverage decision is due to the lack of 
variation for the majority of sample firms with zero long-term debt. 
12
 China’s accounting system began its reform in 1992. Thereafter, China’s accounting standards for listed firms 
have been moving gradually toward the North American Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
13 
 
Wang (2004).
13
 Higher scores on marketization suggest greater market development. We divide the raw 
score in 2002 by 10 to ensure that our regression analysis will have reasonably sized coefficients. 
Guangdong, the province adjacent to Hong Kong, has the highest marketization score of 0.974, while 
Tibet has the lowest score of 0.205. We control for the economic development of different provinces by 
including the growth rate of provincial GDP per capita. 
We also control for important home country characteristics of foreign joint ventures. We use the 
median leverage measure of domestic firms in foreign joint ventures’ home countries as a summary 
measure of both formal and informal institutional development in the home country, the latter including 
culture. Prior work by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999), Booth et al. (2001) and others has 
established the strong association between formal institutions of a country and the capital structure 
decisions of its domestic firms. Under our multivariate regression framework with the culture variables 
explicitly controlled for, the coefficient in front of this summary measure primarily captures the effect of 
the home country formal institutional development on leverage. 
Finally, we include the physical distance between the foreign joint venture’s home country and 
China. Siegel et al. (2008) demonstrate that physical distance, as a proxy for the extent of information 
asymmetry between the foreign investor and the target country,  is an important factor in international 
investment decisions. 
Our final sample includes 8,187 foreign joint ventures in China involving investors from 32 
different countries and regions where they are the majority owner (i.e., foreign ownership is greater than 
50%).
14
 Table A1 in the Appendix gives a detailed breakdown of the countries from which the foreign 
investors come; the number of observations from each country when the foreign investor is the majority 
owner; and key descriptives regarding leverage measures, firm size, foreign ownership, and the level of 
                                                 
13
 Fan and Wang (2004) construct a comprehensive marketization index to proxy for the market development of a 
province. It measures the following aspects: 1) the relationship between government and markets, 2) the 
development of non-state sectors in the economy, 3) the development of product markets 4) the development of 
factor markets, and 5) the development of market intermediaries and the legal environment. See Li, Yue, and Zhao 
(2009) for more detailed discussion of the index. 
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 Three countries are lost as they have only a single observation. Our main results are not affected if we include 
these three country-firm observations. 
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regional development. Table A2 presents industry classification and distribution across countries of these 
foreign joint ventures. Panel A lists the description of each 2-digit SIC industry. Panel B shows that 
different industries attract different levels of foreign investment, with electrical equipment, apparel, and 
communication equipment being the top three industries with the largest number of foreign joint ventures. 
Panel C shows that there is a strong industry effect in leverage measures of these foreign joint ventures. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. Panel A reports that our sample foreign 
joint ventures have an average (median) leverage of 46.6% (46.4%). The sample average (median) short-
term debt is 43.6% (42.9%), suggesting that most of the debt in these foreign joint ventures is short-term. 
About one-fifth of these foreign joint ventures have access to long-term debt. Using a large sample of 
unlisted Chinese firms, Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009) demonstrate that the sample mean (median) ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets is 56.7% (58.9%), the sample mean (median) ratio of short-term debt to total 
assets is 50.3% (51.1%), and 35.4% of their domestic Chinese firms have access to long-term debt. We 
conclude that the foreign joint ventures in our sample tend to have lower total debt (leverage), lower total 
short-term debt, and a lower probability of having long-term debt when compared to domestic Chinese 
firms. This is probably due to the underdeveloped credit markets in China which constrain foreign joint 
ventures’ access to debt capital, and long-term debt in particular (Li, Yue, and Zhao, 2009). 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
Panel B indicates that our sample foreign joint ventures make average annual sales of RMB 78.26 
million yuan with a median of RMB 28.52 million yuan. The average industry-adjusted ROA is 3.2% 
with a lower median of 0.8%. About one-third of total assets are tangible for an average firm in the 
sample, and the average asset maturity is 6.4%. The average Herfindahl index is 0.003. The average of 
industry median leverage is 60.1% and the average of industry median short-term debt is 52.5%. The 
industry frequency of having long-term debt is 31.7%. The average (median) level of foreign ownership 
in our sample foreign joint ventures is 91.4% (100%), which is not surprising given that our sample is 
limited to foreign majority-owned joint ventures. 
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Panel C presents descriptive statistics for the province-level variables. We show that the average 
level of marketization is 0.816, the average per capita GDP growth is 9.8%, and the median growth rate is 
9.3%. 
Panel D presents descriptive statistics for the country-level variables used in our study. We show 
that the average level of mastery is 3.873 and the median is 3.881. The three countries with the highest 
score on mastery are South Africa (4.263), India (4.162), and Greece (4.136); while the three countries 
with the lowest score on mastery are Finland (3.388), Chile (3.535), and Indonesia (3.568). The average 
level of embeddedness is 3.783 and the median is 3.774. Among our 32 countries, the three countries with 
the highest score on embeddedness are Egypt (4.692), Indonesia (4.531), and Malaysia (4.349); while the 
three countries with the lowest score on embeddedness are Switzerland (3.045), France (3.081), and 
Austria (3.185). The average (median) of median leverage of the foreign joint ventures’ home country 
firms is 49.7% (46.1%), the average (median) of median short-term debt of the foreign joint ventures’ 
home country firms is 30.0% (28.7%), and the average (median) of median ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets of the foreign joint ventures’ home country firms is 7.6% (6.7%). The average distance between the 
country of origin of the foreign joint venture and China is 4,324 kilometers. 
Panel E presents the correlation matrix of firm and regional characteristics using firm-level 
observations. There is an extremely high correlation between our leverage and short-term debt ratios 
(0.921). There is a negative association between our short-term debt ratio and foreign joint ventures’ use 
of long-term debt (0.095). On the other hand, there is moderate correlation among most of the firm-level 
explanatory variables. The exceptions are strong relations between industry median leverage and industry 
median short-term debt (0.680), and between industry median leverage and industry frequency of using 
long-term debt (0.504). 
Panel F presents descriptive statistics for the country-level variables using country-level 
observations. Panel G presents the correlation matrix of home country characteristics using country-level 
observations. Consistent with Chui et al. (2002), there is strong negative correlation between 
embeddedness and leverage of the foreign joint ventures’ home country firms. 
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OUR EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATIONS 
 
The Data Structure 
Our data structure is multilevel. At the country level, we have investors from 32 different 
countries investing in China. At the firm level, we have over 8,000 foreign joint ventures with a majority 
foreign ownership stake.
15
 Additionally, there are 30 different provinces/regions in China with large 
developmental disparities and a highly uneven distribution of foreign joint ventures. From a modeling 
perspective, it is important to distinguish the effects that take place at the country level from those that 
take place at the individual firm level; both to understand the role of country- versus firm-level 
determinants, and to appropriately model the effects of culture at the country level. 
We employ a hierarchical nested form of the general linear model to explore our multilevel data 
(see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002 and Goldstein, 2003, for an introduction to hierarchical linear models 
(HLM); and Martin, Cullen, Johnson, and Parboteeah, 2007, for an application of the model in examining 
cross-country and cross-firm differences in the use of bribery). In our data, the sample foreign joint 
ventures within their home countries form the base level observations and their home countries serve as 
the higher level observations. There are two distinct benefits from using an HLM in our setting. First, the 
HLM framework separates the variance in firm-level leverage decisions explained by the firm- versus 
country-level explanatory variables. Second, the HLM framework corrects for the distortion introduced 
by varying sample sizes across countries. Unlike the OLS regression where each firm-level observation 
receives equal weight, the HLM regression simultaneously models regressions at both the firm- and 
country-level.  The country-level regression is weighted by the precision of the firm-level data, which is 
inversely related to the sample size within a country. The power of multilevel models comes from their 
ability to pool firm-level effects across countries while also examining country-level relations. 
                                                 
15
 Note that using the level of foreign ownership as the founding date of the joint venture does not change our main 
results. Results are available upon request. 
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In our empirical investigation we present the results of both the multilevel analyses, incorporating 
information about the foreign joint ventures’ home country affiliation and the standard regression 
analyses across all foreign joint ventures. In the latter case, we ignore the foreign joint ventures’ 
affiliation with a specific country, except for calculating clustered standard errors. The multilevel results 
provide insight into whether the effects take place at the firm- or the country-level, and also provide a 
stricter and more appropriate test of the relevant coefficients. It is possible for the coefficients on the 
country-level variable, such as a cultural value variable, to be spuriously significant just due to the large 
sample size at the firm-level. This problem is accentuated when countries differ markedly in the number 
of foreign joint ventures they contribute to the sample. 
To proceed, we need to process the raw data in the following way. First, we center every right-
hand side variable by its grand mean (averaged across firms and countries) so that every transformed 
variable has a mean of zero. Second, we create country-level mean values (averaged within a country) on 
those grand-mean-centered variables that vary by firm, and we give a suffix to each of these variables as 
―_ctrymean.‖ Here, we treat the regional institutional and economic developmental measures in the same 
way as variables that vary by firm. Finally, we create within-country residuals by taking the grand-mean 
adjusted variables in Step 1 and subtracting the corresponding within-country means in Step 2. We name 
these firm-level deviations from their corresponding country-level means as ―_firmdev.‖ By centering the 
within-country variables (varying by firm) and adding the country-level means to the set of predictors, we 
completely separate the covariances between- and within-country. The decomposition allows us to 
explore the potentially differential effects of firm-level characteristics such as asset maturity at the firm- 
and country-level. Furthermore, using mean-centered variables on the right-hand side makes 
interpretation of the intercept values natural—the expected value of the dependent variable when all right-
hand side variables are at their means. In the end, our model specification contains some variables that 
have only country-level values (cultural values, foreign joint ventures’ home country leverage, and 
distance), while others have country-level and firm-level values (such as firm size, profitability, and 
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foreign ownership); where the country-level values are all grand-mean centered and the firm-level values 
are deviations from the corresponding country-level means. 
 
Our Empirical Specifications 
To explore the relation between country-level factors and capital structure decisions, we employ 
two different model specifications. The first model takes the following form: 
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 (1) 
For foreign joint venture i from country j in year t, Leverage Measure can be the leverage ratio (LEV), the 
short-term debt ratio (STD), or the likelihood of having long-term debt (LTD dummy). 
Equation (1) is a standard cross-sectional (OLS/Probit) regression with lagged right-hand side 
variables. We expect that foreign joint ventures clustered within a province are more likely to have 
similar characteristics, and hence present within-province correlations. These intra-province correlations 
have to be taken into account in parameter estimation. We adopt robust standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the province-level. 
Our second model is an HLM (Probit) specified as follows: 
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 (2) 
Unlike the standard cross-sectional regression with clustered standard errors as shown in 
Equation (1), we decompose firm and province characteristics into firm-level deviations and country-level 
means to examine the differential firm- and country-level effects, and more appropriately estimate the 
significance of the cultural value variables (which vary only across countries). This model is estimated 
using an iterative maximum likelihood fitting procedure available in MLWin. 
 
MAIN RESULTS 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. When the leverage ratio is the dependent variable, under 
the standard OLS regression model we demonstrate that firm size, asset maturity, and foreign ownership 
are positively associated with leverage; while profitability, asset tangibility, and industry concentration 
are negatively associated with leverage. Given that existing capital structure theories are developed to 
explain the financing choices of firms in the industrial world, it is notable that the same set of firm 
characteristics has reasonable explanatory power for leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
After decomposing total variation in firm- and province-level characteristics into firm-level 
deviations and country-level means under our HLM specification, we still find strong significant 
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association between some of our _ctrymean variables and leverage. For example, there is a significantly 
negative association between firm-level leverage and country-mean profitability. This implies that foreign 
joint ventures from countries that tend to choose highly profitable firms also tend to make choices leading 
to low levels of leverage. 
We note that the strength of association could be materially different for the _firmdev variables 
vis-à-vis the _ctrymean variables under our HLM specification. For instance, in the case of asset maturity 
the coefficient on the firm-level deviation measure is 0.118, while the coefficient on the corresponding 
country-level mean measure is 0.843. In our data, because there is much more variation at the firm-level 
than at the country-level (see Table 1), the impact of a unit change in mean asset maturity at the country-
level has a much larger effect on leverage than a unit change in asset maturity at the firm-level. 
With respect to our two province-level environment variables, we show that marketization is 
negatively and GDP growth is positively associated with leverage using both the firm-level deviations 
and the country-level means. The above finding suggests that foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions 
are influenced both by variations within a home country in the choice of firm environment characteristics, 
and by variations across home countries in such choices. 
With respect to our two country-level cultural values (corresponding to the direct effects of 
culture), results from the HLM specification suggest that there is a significantly negative association 
between mastery and leverage. There is almost no association between embeddedness and leverage. 
Finally, we show that there is a significantly negative association between the median leverage of 
domestic firms in the foreign joint venture’s home country and the foreign joint venture’s leverage.16 
Table 2 also presents our regression results using the ratio of short-term debt to total assets as the 
dependent variables. Given the very high correlation between our total debt (leverage) and short-term 
debt variables (Table 1 Panel E), it is not surprising that many of the findings with respect to leverage 
discussed earlier apply here. Most importantly, we still find that there is a significantly negative 
                                                 
16
 Note that the correlation between the median leverage of a foreign joint venture and the corresponding leverage 
measure of domestic firms in the foreign joint venture’s home country, using country-level observations, is positive 
and significant (unreported).  
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association between mastery and short-term debt. Embeddedness continues to have no significant 
association with foreign joint ventures’ short-term debt. 
Finally, Table 2 presents our Probit regression results using the LTD dummy as the dependent 
variable. We show that firm characteristics measured at firm-level deviations (_firmdev) are meaningfully 
associated with foreign joint ventures’ decision to take on long-term debt. For example, firm size, asset 
tangibility, and asset maturity are positively associated with the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ 
having long-term debt. In contrast to the results using leverage and short-term debt as the dependent 
variables, firm characteristics measured at country-level means (_ctrymean) appear to have much less 
influence on foreign joint ventures’ decision to use long-term debt. In particular, only firm size and asset 
maturity measured at country-level means are significantly associated with the likelihood of foreign joint 
ventures’ having long-term debt. The opposite signs of the coefficients on firm-level deviation and 
country-level mean measures of asset maturity imply that individual foreign joint ventures, within a home 
country where managers tend to choose assets with longer maturity, are more likely to employ long-term 
debt. However, countries whose foreign joint ventures tend to employ assets with longer maturity are 
characterized by low usage of long-term debt. Notably, mastery is positively and significantly associated 
with the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt. The negative and significant 
association between mastery and short-term debt suggests that the particular financing hierarchy for high 
mastery managers is as follows: equity first, long-term debt next, and short-term debt last, in contrast to 
the prediction from the pecking order theory of capital structure that debt comes before equity (Myers, 
1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
It is worth noting that in an untabulated analysis where we include additional home country 
institutional variables such as the rule of law, creditor protection, and disclosure, our main results 
regarding the role of cultural values in foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions remain unchanged 
(results are available upon request). 
 
Indirect Effects of Cultural Values 
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The evidence from Table 2 thus far captures only the direct effects of cultural values on leverage. 
Following our modeling framework illustrated in Figure 1, we investigate the indirect effects of culture. 
Table 3 presents the results from this investigation where the two cultural values (along with the control 
variables of median leverage measures of the foreign joint ventures’ home country firms and distance) are 
used to predict the firm- and province-level characteristics. The difference across the three panels in Table 
3 is that in Panel A, we employ the median leverage of domestic firms in the foreign joint ventures’ home 
country as our proxy for the foreign joint venture home country institutional environment, while we use 
the median short-term debt ratio and the median long-term debt ratio in Panels B and C, respectively. 
Insert Table 3 about here. 
Across all three panels, mastery is negatively and significantly related to firm size, industry 
concentration, and per capita GDP growth of the foreign joint venture’s region; implying that foreign joint 
ventures from countries high on mastery tend to choose smaller firms, less concentrated industries, and 
regions with rapid economic growth. Mastery is negatively and significantly related to industry median 
leverage measures in Panels A and B, but not in Panel C. 
Across all three panels, embeddedness is positively and significantly related to marketization; 
implying that foreign joint ventures from countries high on embeddedness tend to choose regions with 
higher levels of institutional development. Embeddedness is negatively and significantly associated with 
firm size and industry concentration in Panel B, and remains negatively and significantly associated with 
industry concentration in Panel C. We find meaningful association between cultural values and foreign 
joint ventures’ choices of firm, industry, and regional characteristics. 
Across Panels A and C, countries whose domestic firms have higher median leverage tend to 
make larger foreign direct investments in China. In Panel C, countries whose domestic firms have higher 
median long-term debt tend to make investments in China with lower asset tangibility and shorter asset 
maturity, suggesting that foreign joint ventures from home countries with a better developed institutional 
framework and better developed credit markets are more willing to invest in less tangible assets and assets 
with shorter maturity. 
23 
 
Finally, across all three panels, the distance between the foreign joint venture’s home country and 
China is negatively and significantly associated with asset tangibility and foreign ownership, and 
positively and significantly associated with marketization. In Panel C, the distance between a foreign joint 
venture’s home country and China is negatively and significantly associated with firm size. 
 
Economic Significance of Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of cultural values on foreign joint ventures’ 
leverage decisions, we examine the consequence of a change in each cultural value on the foreign joint 
ventures’ leverage decisions. Specifically, we first compute the change in mastery from the 25th percentile 
to the 75
th
 percentile using our sample of 32 countries: Mastery = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 
0.2388. Similarly, we compute the change in embeddedness from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile: 
Embed = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.5272. We then examine the effects on different leverage 
measures of foreign joint ventures as a result of the above specific change in each cultural value in Table 
4, which decomposes the total effects into direct and indirect effects. 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
Row (1) in Table 4 presents the coefficients from the indirect effect regression in Table 3. Row (2) 
reports the product of the Row (1) coefficients and the percentile change in mastery: Mastery 
(embeddedness: Embed). Row (3) presents the coefficients from the direct effect regression in Table 2. 
Row (4) reports the product of the Row (2) and Row (3) coefficients, which is the indirect effect as a 
result of specified changes in one cultural value. The sum of indirect effects is the sum of all coefficients 
in Row (4). The direct effect is the product of the coefficient on mastery (embeddedness) in Table 2 and 
the percentile change in mastery: Mastery (embeddedness: Embed). The total effect is the sum of 
indirect and direct effects. 
Panel A presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on leverage. We show that 
when mastery is increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile, the direct effect is to decrease 
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leverage by 2.15%, and the indirect effect through firm and regional characteristics is to decrease leverage 
by 1.08%. The total effect is to decrease leverage by 3.23%. Given that the sample mean (median) 
leverage ratio is 46.6% (46.4%), these effects are of clear economic significance. As some examples of 
the total effects of mastery on leverage, we show that the leverage ratio of Guangzhou Nanxin 
Pharmaceutical Limited Corporation, a subsidiary of India’s largest pharmaceutical company Ranbaxy 
Laboratories Limited, is 58.3%. Note that India is the country with the second highest score on mastery. 
In contrast, the leverage ratio of Meizhuo Paper Machinery (Wuxin) Limited Corporation, a subsidiary of 
Finnish multinational Metso, is 84.8%. Note that Finland is the country with the lowest score on mastery. 
For the cultural value of embeddedness, when it is increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 
percentile the direct effect is to increase leverage by 0.05%, and the indirect effect through firm and 
regional characteristics is to increase leverage by 1.93%. The total effect is to increase leverage by 1.99%. 
It is worth noting that the total effect of mastery on leverage is negative, consistent with Chui et al. (2002). 
In contrast, the total effect of embeddedness on leverage in the foreign joint venture setting is positive. As 
some examples of the total effects of embeddedness on leverage, we show that Kunming Fen Mei Yi 
Limited corporation, a subsidiary of Swiss firm Firmenich, has a leverage ratio of 12.8%. Note that 
Switzerland is the country with the lowest score on embeddedness. In contrast, Jin Hua Sheng Paper 
Limited Corporation, a subsidiary of Indonesian firm APP Indonesia, has a leverage ratio of 74.7%. Note 
that Indonesia is the country with the highest score on embeddedness. 
Panel B presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on short-term debt. We 
demonstrate that when mastery is increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile, the direct effect 
is to decrease short-term debt by 2.89%, and the indirect effect through firm and regional characteristics is 
to increase short-term debt by 2.28%. The total effect is to decrease short-term debt by 0.61%. Given that 
the sample mean (median) short-term debt ratio is 43.6% (42.9%), the direct and indirect effects are of 
economic significance. For the cultural value of embeddedness, when it is increased from the 25
th
 
percentile to the 75
th
 percentile the direct effect is to decrease short-term debt by 1.95%, and the indirect 
effect through firm and regional characteristics is to increase short-term debt by 3.19%. The total effect is 
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to increase short-term debt by 1.24%. It is worth noting that the direct and indirect effects of both mastery 
and embeddedness are offsetting in the case of short-term debt. 
Panel C presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on the likelihood of foreign 
joint ventures’ having long-term debt. Row (5) in Panel C presents the marginal effects on the probability 
of having long-term debt. We show that when mastery is increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 
percentile the direct effect is to increase the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt by 
3.74%, and the indirect effect through firm and regional characteristics is to decrease the likelihood of 
foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt by 6.92%. The total effect is to decrease the likelihood of 
foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt by 3.18%. Given that the sample frequency of foreign joint 
ventures’ taking on long-term debt is 19%, these effects are of clear economic significance. For the 
cultural value of embeddedness, when it is increased from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile the 
direct effect is to increase the likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ having long-term debt by 2.0%, and the 
indirect effect through firm and regional characteristics is to increase the likelihood of foreign joint 
ventures’ having long-term debt by 0.04%. The total effect is to increase the likelihood of foreign joint 
ventures’ taking on long-term debt by 2.04%. It is worth noting that the direct effect of mastery on the 
likelihood of foreign joint ventures’ possessing long-term debt is positive, but the total effect is 
dominated by the negative indirect effect. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we present evidence supporting the important role of national culture (as captured by 
mastery and embeddedness) in corporate leverage decisions. We expect that there is a cultural effect on 
foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions, but the direction of that effect is ultimately an empirical 
question. Furthermore, we expect both cultural values to have indirect influences on foreign joint 
ventures’ leverage decisions through the choice of firm characteristics, industry, and region of investment.  
Using data on over 8,000 foreign joint ventures in China from 32 different countries, we 
demonstrate that mastery has negative and significant direct effects on foreign joint ventures’ leverage 
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and short-term debt decisions, and positive and significant direct effects on the likelihood of foreign joint 
ventures’ having long-term debt. The indirect effects of mastery on leverage decisions sometimes 
reinforce, and occasionally offset, the direct effects. Embeddedness has no significant direct effect on 
foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions, but exerts its influence entirely through indirect effects. Finally, 
economic significance analysis of the total effects suggests that national culture has significant 
explanatory power in the financial leverage decisions of foreign joint ventures in China. Note that in this 
study, we do not have data on the country of origin of foreign joint venture managers.  An interesting area 
for future research, when more detailed data become available, is to examine whether managers’ decision-
making reflects their corporate culture or their own national culture. 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three important ways. First, our paper tests the 
portability of national cultures in a setting where foreign joint ventures operate and make corporate 
decisions outside their home countries. The results in our paper support the growing awareness among 
finance researchers that informal institutions such as culture, level of trust, and social capital matter in 
financial decisions, even when those decisions are made by sophisticated managers and outside of those 
managers’ home countries. Second, we apply a novel empirical methodology that is appropriate for the 
hierarchical structure of our data. The new empirical specification allows us to decompose the relation 
between firm characteristics and leverage, as well as regional characteristics and leverage, into country-
level and individual firm-level components. Finally, we demonstrate that cultural values not only directly 
influence capital structure decisions, but also influence other choices such as firm size and investment 
location that in turn affect capital structure decisions. We hope our research stimulates further studies on 
the important role of cultural values in corporate finance decisions. 
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Appendix:  
 
Table A1. Sample Overview 
 
This table presents the country distribution of foreign joint ventures in the data. N gives the number of foreign joint ventures where the 
foreign investor is the majority owner by country of origin. LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio 
of short-term liabilities over total assets. LTD dummy is set equal to one if the firm has long-term debt, and zero otherwise. Firm size is 
annual sales measured in millions of RMB yuan. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by foreign investors. The 
marketization index captures the regional institutional development and is from Fan and Wang (2004). 
 
 N LEV STD LTD dummy Firm size  Foreign ownership Marketization 
Country  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Argentina 7 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.29 0.00 33.3 23.0 0.82 1.00 0.78 0.81 
Australia 111 0.51 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.16 0.00 49.8 26.9 0.90 1.00 0.81 0.85 
Austria 15 0.41 0.43 0.37 0.43 0.13 0.00 54.4 26.2 0.81 0.88 0.77 0.81 
Belgium 20 0.49 0.40 0.48 0.40 0.05 0.00 74.4 61.0 0.84 1.00 0.80 0.81 
Brazil 7 0.48 0.59 0.43 0.52 0.29 0.00 58.1 15.4 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.91 
Canada 75 0.53 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.16 0.00 45.8 20.2 0.88 1.00 0.80 0.85 
Denmark 16 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.36 0.13 0.00 234.5 119.6 0.97 1.00 0.76 0.71 
Finland 20 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.20 0.00 254.8 143.3 0.87 1.00 0.81 0.81 
France 127 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.16 0.00 86.8 45.7 0.85 1.00 0.81 0.85 
Germany 258 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.21 0.00 106.4 52.4 0.85 1.00 0.80 0.81 
Greece 2 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.50 17.9 17.9 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.86 
India 3 0.48 0.58 0.48 0.58 0.00 0.00 116.6 55.0 0.94 1.00 0.82 0.81 
Indonesia 37 0.54 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.00 112.3 39.7 0.91 1.00 0.86 0.87 
Italy 50 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.16 0.00 66.5 25.9 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.85 
Japan 181 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.24 0.00 85.5 30.7 0.89 1.00 0.80 0.81 
Malaysia 102 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.22 0.00 80.8 25.8 0.87 1.00 0.82 0.85 
Netherlands 110 0.50 0.52 0.46 0.47 0.23 0.00 167.0 63.7 0.86 1.00 0.83 0.81 
New 
Zealand 
13 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.53 0.23 0.00 126.2 21.5 0.92 1.00 0.85 0.91 
Norway 7 0.59 0.59 0.38 0.45 0.57 1.00 112.0 90.9 0.74 0.70 0.82 0.81 
Peru 4 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.51 0.00 0.00 16.4 17.0 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.85 
Philippines 69 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.33 0.09 0.00 57.8 29.7 0.92 1.00 0.85 0.87 
Portugal 3 0.74 0.79 0.62 0.59 0.67 1.00 251.7 43.7 0.86 1.00 0.77 0.85 
Singapore 598 0.47 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.25 0.00 107.0 44.8 0.93 1.00 0.83 0.85 
South 
Africa 
3 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.53 0.33 0.00 20.3 21.5 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.87 
South 
Korea 
828 0.50 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.16 0.00 77.1 25.6 0.95 1.00 0.73 0.71 
Spain 21 0.53 0.55 0.48 0.44 0.14 0.00 46.2 30.3 0.82 0.97 0.81 0.81 
Sweden 44 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.11 0.00 155.8 64.6 0.87 1.00 0.79 0.81 
Switzerland 67 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.21 0.00 169.1 79.2 0.88 0.98 0.80 0.81 
Taiwan 2168 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.14 0.00 40.7 19.9 0.96 1.00 0.86 0.87 
Thailand 73 0.49 0.52 0.45 0.42 0.26 0.00 84.9 35.5 0.87 1.00 0.74 0.81 
UK 339 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.00 119.2 47.8 0.91 1.00 0.82 0.85 
US 1,109 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.17 0.00 87.5 31.5 0.89 1.00 0.82 0.85 
              
Total 8,187 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.19 0.00 78.2 28.5 0.91 1.00 0.82 0.85 
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Table A2. Industry Classification and Distribution 
 
This table presents the industry classification and distribution of foreign joint ventures in the data. LEV is measured 
as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. LTD 
dummy is set equal to one if the firm has long-term debt, and zero otherwise. Panel A lists the 2-digit SIC industry 
classification and description. Panel B presents the industry distribution across countries. Panel C presents 
descriptive statistics of capital structure variables across industries. 
 
Panel A: 2-Digit SIC Industry Classification and Description 
 SIC Industry Description 
13 Agricultural product processing 
14 Food 
15 Beverage 
16 Tobacco 
17 Textile 
18 Apparel 
19 Leather and allied product 
20 Wood processing and related product 
21 Furniture and related product 
22 Paper and related product 
23 Printing and related support activities 
24 Educational product 
25 Petroleum, coal and nuclear power processing 
26 Chemical product 
27 Pharmaceutical and medicine 
28 Artificial synthetic fibers 
29 Rubber product 
30 Plastic product 
31 Nonmetallic mineral product 
32 Primary metal product and processing 
33 Nonferrous metal product and processing 
34 Fabricated metal product 
35 General purpose machinery 
36 Industrial machinery 
37 Transportation equipment 
39 Engine, turbine and power transmission equipment 
40 Communication equipment, computer and electronic product 
41 Electrical equipment, appliance and component 
42 Miscellaneous 
43 Recycled resources and material processing 
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Panel B: Industry Distribution Across Countries 
Country 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 
                           
Argentina 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Australia 3 7 1 10 17 2 0 5 4 2 1 0 8 1 1 0 4 9 1 0 10 5 3 3 4 8 
Austria 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 
Belgium 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 0 1 0 1 2 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 
Canada 2 0 0 3 2 3 3 3 1 2 0 0 10 2 2 0 6 4 1 2 5 3 6 3 2 7 
Denmark 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 
Finland 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 5 0 1 6 
France 0 4 2 3 6 8 0 0 1 2 3 3 20 3 0 2 2 7 0 2 9 4 8 10 12 8 
Germany 2 1 1 5 6 1 2 0 1 0 4 3 40 5 2 2 11 9 0 3 20 44 17 20 21 22 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 3 2 0 7 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 3 2 0 0 4 3 
Italy 0 3 0 3 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 3 3 2 6 1 
Japan 119 48 16 132 308 31 34 16 24 19 24 2 93 18 7 26 108 64 14 16 100 116 66 60 136 168 
Malaysia 5 5 5 5 2 0 7 5 2 4 3 0 3 2 1 3 3 16 0 0 3 3 2 4 4 12 
Netherlands 4 5 2 3 3 2 1 0 6 0 1 1 16 3 0 0 3 2 0 2 8 5 7 4 16 11 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Peru 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 2 7 2 8 6 7 3 0 3 1 2 0 3 0 0 1 9 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Singapore 22 44 19 14 20 7 9 12 36 8 7 1 39 8 2 13 51 37 6 3 40 25 15 16 44 74 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 28 19 1 65 84 72 7 6 13 2 49 0 30 3 10 19 54 29 1 3 41 31 6 7 58 131 
Spain 0 3 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 2 
Sweden 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 5 2 4 9 7 
Switzerland 1 2 3 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 13 5 0 1 2 0 0 2 3 4 6 0 5 6 
Taiwan 57 52 12 127 144 87 58 56 51 24 109 3 110 10 13 41 180 109 10 7 175 108 64 92 128 153 
Thailand 27 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 0 3 0 1 1 3 2 0 0 3 1 0 2 5 4 
UK 24 11 9 11 11 4 7 7 10 0 9 4 23 5 1 2 26 26 5 1 23 16 10 30 18 31 
US 32 32 12 31 59 27 16 24 18 4 46 6 89 40 7 9 48 42 1 16 78 97 50 57 84 92 
                           
Total 333 251 90 436 692 260 156 136 174 70 266 24 517 113 48 125 517 372 45 61 536 482 275 319 570 751 
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Panel C: Leverage Measures Across Industries 
 
 
 
 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 40 41 
LEV                           
Mean 0.49  0.45  0.45  0.46  0.47  0.51  0.50  0.54  0.48  0.42  0.49  0.41  0.45  0.44  0.47  0.46  0.44  0.45  0.51  0.49  0.48  0.43  0.47  0.42  0.48  0.49  
5
th
 percentile 0.07  0.09  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.11  0.09  0.16  0.13  0.08  0.11  0.04  0.09  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.08  0.07  0.16  0.18  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.10  0.10  
Median 0.51  0.42  0.46  0.46  0.46  0.52  0.50  0.57  0.48  0.41  0.52  0.34  0.44  0.43  0.48  0.45  0.44  0.45  0.53  0.43  0.48  0.41  0.48  0.42  0.47  0.49  
95
th
 percentile 0.91  0.86  0.83  0.84  0.89  0.90  0.93  0.86  0.86  0.75  0.84  0.81  0.85  0.86  0.92  0.87  0.82  0.88  0.81  0.85  0.86  0.81  0.85  0.82  0.86  0.85  
                           
STD                           
Mean 0.45  0.40  0.39  0.41  0.44  0.49  0.47  0.50  0.44  0.38  0.47  0.34  0.42  0.40  0.42  0.43  0.41  0.40  0.46  0.45  0.45  0.40  0.44  0.39  0.46  0.47  
5
th
 percentile 0.05  0.07  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.11  0.07  0.14  0.09  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.08  0.03  0.06  0.07  0.05  0.06  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.09  
Median 0.45  0.37  0.36  0.40  0.42  0.50  0.44  0.52  0.43  0.39  0.49  0.29  0.41  0.40  0.45  0.42  0.39  0.38  0.46  0.40  0.45  0.38  0.46  0.39  0.46  0.46  
95
th
 percentile 0.88  0.81  0.82  0.82  0.87  0.89  0.93  0.84  0.84  0.74  0.84  0.79  0.83  0.83  0.90  0.87  0.80  0.84  0.77  0.81  0.85  0.77  0.81  0.79  0.85  0.85  
                           
LTD dummy                           
Mean 0.21  0.23  0.22  0.24  0.13  0.16  0.17  0.17  0.25  0.20  0.14  0.25  0.22  0.21  0.25  0.16  0.20  0.26  0.29  0.26  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.21  0.13  0.19  
5
th
 percentile 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Median 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
95
th
 percentile 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  
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Figure 1. Direct and Indirect Effects of Cultural Values on Foreign Joint Ventures’ 
Leverage Decisions  
 
  
Strategy of foreign joint 
ventures 
(Unobserved in our data) 
 
 
Joint optimization process involving capital structure, investment, control, and governance 
subject to a number of restrictions including institutions, capital availability, and 
production process 
 
Total Effects of Culture 
 
Specific outcome of interest: foreign joint 
ventures’ leverage decisions where culture 
affects the marginal benefits and costs of 
having debt 
 
 Direct Effects  
 Mastery and embeddedness are 
related to leverage 
 Indirect Effects   
 Firm size, industry concentration, 
industry leverage, and the level of 
regional institutional development 
are related to leverage  
 
(1) 
  
Cultural background of 
foreign joint venture 
managers 
 
Home country formal 
institutions of foreign 
joint ventures 
 
Indirect Effects of Culture 
 
Outcome of the joint optimization process 
including firm size, industry 
concentration, industry leverage, level of 
regional institutional investment, etc 
 
 Mastery is associated with smaller 
firms, less concentrated industries, and 
industries with lower leverage 
 Embeddedness is associated with larger 
firms, less concentrated industries, and 
higher level of regional institutional 
development  
 
(2) (3) (4) 
(5) (6) 
(7) 
  36 
Figure 2. Channels of Influence of Cultural Values on Foreign Joint Ventures’ Leverage Decisions 
 
 
     
High Mastery High Embeddedness 
Costs of financial 
distress 
 
Focus on personal 
success; hence avoid 
loss of control 
associated with 
bankruptcy 
Magnifies the 
psychological costs of 
financial distress; leads 
to reduced use of debt 
Agency costs of 
debt 
 
Dislike loss of 
control due to debt 
monitoring; hence 
avoid constraint of 
debt 
Magnifies the 
agency costs of 
debt; leads to 
reduced use of debt 
Agency costs of equity 
 
Seek control; hence 
prefer debt financing 
which enables them to 
have high ownership 
with minimum own 
equity 
Costs of financial 
distress 
 
Care about harmonious 
working relationships and 
avoid loss of face when a 
debt-supported venture 
fails; hence avoid 
bankruptcy associated 
with debt financing 
 
Agency costs of 
debt 
 
Prefer security, 
avoid risky 
investments and 
risky debt financing 
Agency costs of equity  
 
Put group interests ahead 
of self interest; hence less 
need for the disciplinary 
role of debt 
 
Dislike autonomy and  
hence do not mind 
constraint of debt 
 
 
Magnifies the agency 
costs of equity; leads 
to increased use of 
debt 
Applies to foreign 
joint ventures 
Applies to foreign 
joint ventures 
Applies to foreign 
joint ventures 
Magnifies the costs 
of financial distress; 
leads to reduced use 
of debt 
Weakly applies to 
foreign joint 
ventures 
The direction of influence is an empirical question 
Mitigates the agency 
costs of debt; leads 
to reduced use of 
debt 
Conflicting effects on the 
agency costs of equity; 
leads to no clear prediction 
on the use of debt 
Applies to foreign 
joint ventures  
Applies to foreign joint 
ventures but with mixed 
predictions 
The direction of influence is an empirical question  
(1) 
(2) 
(3) (4) 
(5) 
(6) 
() () (+) () () (/+) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Our sample contains the population of Chinese manufacturing firms that have foreign investors tracked by the NBS 
in 2002. We drop observations with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all firm-
level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our final sample has 8,187 foreign joint venture 
observations where the foreign investor is the majority owner (i.e., foreign ownership > 50%). LEV is measured as 
the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. LTD dummy is 
set equal to one if the firm has long-term debt, and zero otherwise. Firm size is annual sales measured in millions of 
RMB yuan. Profitability is earnings before taxes divided by total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset 
tangibility is total fixed assets divided by total assets. Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets) × 
(current assets/cost of goods sold) and (fixed assets/total assets) × (fixed assets/depreciation), divided by 100. 
Industry concentration is the Herfindahl index using sales. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital 
contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index captures the regional institutional development and is 
from Fan and Wang (2004). Per capita GDP growth is the annual rate of growth in per capita GDP for different 
provinces and regions. Mastery and embeddedness are from Schwartz (2004). Home country median measures the 
median value of the foreign joint ventures’ home country firms’ leverage, short-term debt, and long-term debt. 
Distance measures the physical distance from the foreign joint venture’s home country and China. Panel A presents 
descriptive statistics of capital structure variables. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of firm characteristics. 
Panel C presents descriptive statistics of province-level variables. Panel D presents descriptive statistics of various 
cultural values and country-level controls. Panel E presents the correlation matrix using firm-level observations with 
P-values in brackets. Panel F presents descriptive statistics of country-level variables using country-level 
observations. Panel G presents the correlation matrix for country-level variables using country-level observations 
with p-values in brackets. 
 
Panel A: Leverage Measures 
 N Mean Std. Dev 
5
th
 
Percentile 
Median 
95
th
 
Percentile 
LEV 8,187 0.466 0.237 0.086 0.464 0.863 
STD 8,187 0.436 0.238 0.068 0.429 0.843 
LTD dummy 8,187 0.190 0.393 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Firm-level Characteristics 
 N Mean Std. Dev 
5
th
 
Percentile 
Median 
95
th
 
Percentile 
Firm Size (in millions) 8,187 78.26  134.8  6.225  28.52  378.8  
Log(Firm Size) 8,187 10.43  1.213  8.736  10.26  12.84  
Profitability 8,187 0.032  0.113  -0.121  0.008  0.256  
Asset Tangibility  8,187 0.347  0.193  0.061  0.333  0.691  
Asset Maturity 8,187 0.064  0.103  0.010  0.038  0.173  
Industry Concentration 8,187 0.003  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.011  
Industry Median LEV 8,187 0.601  0.029  0.556  0.601  0.651  
Industry Median STD 8,187 0.525  0.031  0.470  0.522  0.563  
Industry Median LTD 8,187 0.317  0.081  0.186  0.307  0.462  
Foreign Ownership 8,187 0.914  0.155  0.550  1.000  1.000  
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Panel C: Province-level Characteristics 
 N Mean Std. Dev 5
th
 Percentile Median 95
th
 Percentile 
Marketization 8,187 0.816  0.114  0.603  0.854  0.974  
Per Capita GDP Growth 8,187 0.098  0.015  0.080  0.093  0.131  
 
Panel D: Country-level Characteristics 
 N Mean Std. Dev 5
th
 Percentile Median 95
th
 Percentile 
Mastery 8,187 3.873  0.109  3.631  3.881  3.973  
Embeddedness 8,187 3.783  0.293  3.188  3.774  4.212  
Home country Median LEV 8,187 0.497  0.060  0.440  0.461  0.634  
Home country Median STD 8,187 0.300  0.055  0.195  0.287  0.365  
Home country Median LTD 8,187 0.076  0.032  0.045  0.067  0.127  
Distance (in km) 8,187 4324  3686  959  2125  11236  
Log(Distance) 8,187 8.026  0.819  6.866  7.662  9.327  
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Panel E: The Correlation Matrix of Firm and Regional Characteristics Using Firm-level Observations 
 LEV STD 
LTD 
dummy 
Log(Firm 
size) 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry 
Concentration 
Industry 
Median  
LEV 
Industry 
Median 
STD 
Industry 
Median 
LTD 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
STD 0.921             
 [0.000]             
LTD dummy 0.119 -0.095            
 [0.000] [0.000]            
Log(Firm Size) 0.052 0.038 0.101           
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]           
Profitability -0.234 -0.198 -0.053 0.237          
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]          
Asset Tangibility -0.177 -0.240 0.158 0.012 -0.198         
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.279] [0.000]         
Asset Maturity -0.021 -0.065 0.086 -0.027 -0.066 0.373        
 [0.056] [0.000] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.000]        
Industry Concentration -0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.199 0.066 -0.053 -0.025       
 [0.501] [0.893] [0.849] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.022]       
Industry Median LEV -0.030 -0.040 0.036 0.059 0.042 0.026 -0.006 -0.021      
 [0.007] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.597] [0.055]      
Industry Median STD -0.004 0.015 -0.032 0.029 0.065 -0.090 -0.058 -0.038 0.680     
 [0.697] [0.177] [0.004] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]     
Industry Median LTD -0.047 -0.075 0.078 0.083 0.015 0.098 0.043 0.164 0.504 -0.216    
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.189] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Foreign Ownership 0.041 0.036 0.004 -0.081 -0.040 0.050 0.017 -0.035 -0.089 -0.008 -0.123   
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.704] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.122] [0.002] [0.000] [0.499] [0.000]   
Marketization 0.011 0.038 -0.063 0.011 -0.027 -0.068 -0.031 -0.006 -0.048 0.048 -0.106 0.150  
 [0.313] [0.001] [0.000] [0.314] [0.016] [0.000] [0.005] [0.582] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  
Per Capita GDP Growth 0.062 0.064 0.048 -0.015 0.067 -0.004 -0.001 -0.023 0.047 0.080 -0.051 -0.018 0.003 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.185] [0.000] [0.699] [0.907] [0.037] [0.[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.104] [0.771] 
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Panel F: Country-level Characteristics Using the Country-level Observations 
 N Mean Std. Dev 5
th
 Percentile Median 
95
th
 
Percentile 
Mastery 32 3.810  0.182  3.569  3.793  4.162  
Embeddedness 32 3.640  0.376  3.081  3.561  4.349  
Home country Median LEV 32 0.531  0.090  0.386  0.536  0.654  
Home country Median STD 32 0.294  0.055  0.190  0.300  0.385  
Home country Median LTD 32 0.107  0.055  0.024  0.107  0.195  
Distance (in km) 32 7860  4273  1645  7785  16911  
Log(Distance) 32 8.793  0.668  7.405  8.960  9.736  
 
Panel G: The Correlation Matrix Using the Country-level Observations 
  
Mastery Embeddedness 
Home 
Country 
Median LEV 
Home 
Country 
Median STD 
Home 
Country 
Median LTD 
Embeddedness 
 
0.089 
[0.629] 
    
Home Country Median LEV 
 
-0.074 
[0.689] 
-0.580 
[0.001] 
   
Home Country Median STD 
0.044 
[0.809] 
-0.231 
[0.204] 
0.701 
[0.000] 
  
Home Country Median LTD 
-0.017 
[0.926] 
-0.536 
[0.002] 
0.637 
[0.000] 
0.302 
[0.093] 
 
Log(Distance) 
-0.095 
[0.604] 
-0.341 
[0.056] 
0.118 
[0.519] 
-0.234 
[0.198] 
0.365 
[0.040] 
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Table 2. Capital Structure Regressions 
 
Our sample contains the population of Chinese manufacturing firms that have foreign investors tracked by the NBS in 2002. We drop observations with negative values of 
total assets, total liabilities, and sales, and winsorize all firm-level variables at the 1% level in both tails of the distribution. Our final sample has 8,187 foreign joint venture 
observations where the foreign investor is the majority owner (i.e., foreign ownership > 50%). LEV is measured as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. STD is the 
ratio of short-term liabilities over total assets. LTD dummy is set equal to one if the firm has long-term debt, and zero otherwise. Firm size is annual sales measured in 
millions of RMB yuan. Profitability is earnings before taxes divided by total assets adjusted by the industry median. Asset tangibility is total fixed assets divided by total 
assets. Asset maturity is the sum of (current assets/total assets) × (current assets/cost of goods sold) and (fixed assets/total assets) × (fixed assets/depreciation), divided by 100. 
Industry concentration is the Herfindahl index using sales. Foreign ownership is the fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by foreign investors. The marketization index 
captures the regional institutional development and is from Fan and Wang (2004). Per capita GDP growth is the annual rate of growth in per capita GDP for different 
provinces and regions. Mastery and embeddedness are from Schwartz (2004). Home country median measures the median value of the foreign joint ventures’ home country 
firms’ leverage, short-term debt, and long-term debt. Distance measures the physical distance from the foreign joint venture’s home country and China. For each different 
leverage measure (LEV, STD, or LTD dummy), we present estimation results under two model specifications. OLS/Probit gives the regression results using standard cross-
sectional regressions with robust standard errors clustering at the province level. HLM (Probit) gives the regression results using the Hierarchical Linear Model specification 
where the right-hand side variables are decomposed into firm-level deviations and country-level means. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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  LEV  STD  LTD dummy 
  OLS HLM  OLS HLM  Probit HLM (Probit) 
   _firmdev _ctrymean   _firmdev _ctrymean   _firmdev _ctrymean 
Firm Characteristics             
Firm Size  0.030*** 0.030*** 0.048*  0.026*** 0.027*** 0.025  0.135*** 0.126*** 0.496*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.025)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.021)  (0.019) (0.014) (0.150) 
Profitability  -0.668*** -0.670*** -1.186***  -0.610*** -0.608*** -0.834***  -0.818*** -0.793*** -2.899 
  (0.033) (0.023) (0.293)  (0.033) (0.023) (0.310)  (0.153) (0.161) (2.117) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.326*** -0.314*** -0.995***  -0.377*** -0.370*** -0.929***  0.909*** 0.873*** 1.743 
  (0.016) (0.014) (0.179)  (0.019) (0.014) (0.193)  (0.085) (0.094) (1.266) 
Asset Maturity  0.124*** 0.118*** 0.843**  0.066*** 0.061** 0.314  0.423*** 0.485*** -6.477** 
  (0.020) (0.025) (0.415)  (0.019) (0.025) (0.491)  (0.104) (0.156) (2.881) 
Industry Concentration  -2.020* -2.041** -12.860  -1.536 -1.508* -31.570*  -8.055* -7.705 -61.760 
  (1.096) (0.826) (16.250)  (1.158) (0.824) (17.570)  (4.685) (5.636) (109.900) 
Industry Median  -0.118 -0.112 0.518  0.027 0.032 -3.103**  0.973*** 0.976*** -1.900 
  (0.138) (0.085) (1.583)  (0.114) (0.078) (1.359)  (0.175) (0.215) (3.070) 
Foreign Ownership  0.072*** 0.063*** 0.296*  0.056** 0.050*** 0.429***  0.250* 0.281** -1.592 
  (0.024) (0.016) (0.171)  (0.021) (0.016) (0.152)  (0.136) (0.112) (1.079) 
Province Characteristics             
Marketization  -0.090*** -0.071*** -0.303*  -0.028 -0.018 -0.187  -0.747*** -0.712*** 0.537 
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.165)  (0.024) (0.023) (0.165)  (0.244) (0.155) (1.117) 
Per capita GDP Growth  1.378*** 1.262*** 6.518**  1.306*** 1.242*** 6.523**  6.044*** 5.957*** 19.982 
  (0.206) (0.158) (2.751)  (0.204) (0.158) (2.729)  (1.868) (1.063) (19.238) 
Country Characteristics             
Mastery  -0.076**  -0.090***  -0.128***  -0.121***  0.307*  0.602** 
  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.035)  (0.162)  (0.244) 
Embeddedness  -0.014  0.001  -0.006  -0.037  -0.184**  0.146 
  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.077)  (0.124) 
Home Country Median  -0.384***  -0.282**  -0.631***  -0.342***  -3.121**  -2.908** 
  (0.093)  (0.143)  (0.050)  (0.123)  (1.219)  (1.290) 
Distance  0.001  0.004  -0.032***  -0.007  0.096***  0.116* 
  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.030)  (0.065) 
Intercept  0.763***  0.466***  1.109***  0.436***  -4.170***  -0.926*** 
  (0.195)  (0.002)  (0.190)  (0.002)  (0.769)  (0.017) 
             
Number of Observations  8,187    8,187    8,187   
Adjusted R2/Pseudo R2  0.14    0.16    0.052   
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Table 3. Indirect Effects of Country-level Variables 
 
To explore the indirect effects of cultural values and home country leverage on foreign joint ventures’ leverage decision, we present estimation results under the 
HLM specification. Standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A presents regressions of firm-level and province-level characteristics on country-level variables: 
mastery, embeddedness, log(distance), and home country firms’ median leverage. Panel B presents regressions of firm-level and province-level characteristics on 
country-level variables: mastery, embeddedness, log(distance), and home country firms’ median short-term debt. Panel C presents regressions of firm-level and 
province-level characteristics on country-level variables: mastery, embeddedness, log(distance), and home country firms’ median long-term debt.  
 
Panel A: Explaining Firm-level and Province-level Characteristics Using Cultural Values, Home Country Median Leverage, and Distance  
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry 
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
LEV 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Mastery -1.201** 0.046 -0.061 0.033 -0.002*** -0.018** 0.024 0.019 -0.006* 
 (0.457) (0.033) (0.054) (0.029) (0.001) (0.007) (0.046) (0.033) (0.003) 
Embeddedness -0.269 -0.031 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.025 0.053** 0.002 
 (0.286) (0.021) (0.034) (0.018) (0.000) (0.005) (0.029) (0.021) (0.002) 
Home Country Median LEV 2.191* -0.015 -0.128 -0.099 0.001 0.002 -0.051 0.061 0.005 
 (1.135) (0.082) (0.134) (0.072) (0.002) (0.018) (0.115) (0.083) (0.008) 
Log(Distance) -0.196 0.005 -0.050*** -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.024* 0.022** 0.001 
 (0.132) (0.010) (0.016) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.010) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.146 0.007 0.019 0.009 -0.000 0.000 -0.012 -0.013 -0.001 
 (0.129) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.009) (0.001) 
          
Number of Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Adjusted R
2
 0.32 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.31 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.02 
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Panel B: Explaining Firm-level and Province-level Characteristics Using Cultural Values, Home Country Median Short-term Debt, and Distance 
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry 
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
STD 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Mastery -1.247** 0.046 -0.057 0.037 -0.002*** -0.022** 0.026 0.017 -0.006* 
 (0.483) (0.033) (0.053) (0.029) (0.001) (0.008) (0.046) (0.033) (0.003) 
Embeddedness -0.524* -0.028 0.008 0.005 -0.001** -0.005 0.028 0.051*** 0.001 
 (0.263) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016) (0.000) (0.004) (0.025) (0.018) (0.002) 
Home Country Median STD 1.213 0.027 -0.232 -0.154 0.000 0.013 -0.084 0.124 0.003 
 (1.723) (0.118) (0.191) (0.102) (0.002) (0.029) (0.166) (0.118) (0.012) 
Log(Distance) -0.188 0.006 -0.056*** -0.005 -0.000 0.002 -0.025* 0.025** 0.001 
 (0.148) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.010) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.182 0.006 0.019 0.009 -0.000 -0.005** -0.012 -0.013 -0.001 
 (0.135) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.013) (0.009) (0.001) 
          
Number of Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Adjusted R
2
 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.03 0.30 0.20 0.12 0.17 0.02 
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Panel C: Explaining Firm-level and Province-level Characteristics Using Cultural Values, Home Country Median Long-term Debt, and Distance 
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry 
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
LTD 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Mastery -1.297*** 0.043 -0.052 0.039 -0.002*** -0.011 0.024 0.018 -0.006* 
 (0.427) (0.032) (0.047) (0.026) (0.001) (0.030) (0.046) (0.034) (0.003) 
Embeddedness -0.254 -0.015 -0.021 -0.007 -0.001* -0.015 0.037 0.047** 0.001 
 (0.248) (0.018) (0.027) (0.015) (0.000) (0.017) (0.027) (0.020) (0.002) 
Home Country Median LTD 4.900*** 0.201 -0.603*** -0.291** 0.001 0.015 0.075 0.038 0.007 
 (1.720) (0.127) (0.188) (0.106) (0.003) (0.120) (0.187) (0.136) (0.014) 
Log(Distance) -0.307** 0.002 -0.039*** 0.004 -0.000 -0.010 -0.024* 0.021** 0.001 
 (0.127) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.001) 
Intercept 0.147 0.004 0.022 0.010 -0.000 0.015* -0.014 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.119) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.001) 
          
Number of Observations 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Adjusted R
2
 0.41 0.14 0.45 0.18 0.30 -0.07 0.12 0.14 0.02 
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Table 4. Economic Significance of Culture 
 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of cultural values on foreign joint ventures’ leverage decisions, we first compute the change in mastery from 
the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile using our sample of 32 countries: Mastery = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.2388. Similarly, we compute the change 
in embeddedness from the 25
th
 percentile to the 75
th
 percentile using our sample of 32 countries: Embed = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.5272. Row (1) in 
each table below presents the coefficients from the indirect effect regression in Table 3. Row (2) reports the product of the Row (1) coefficients and the percentile 
change in mastery: Mastery (embeddedness: Embed). Row (3) displays the coefficients from the direct effect regression in Table 2. Row (4) presents the 
product of the Row (2) and Row (3) coefficients which is the indirect effect due to specified changes in a cultural value. The sum of indirect effects is the sum of 
all coefficients in Row (4). The direct effect is the product of the coefficient on mastery (embeddedness) in Table 2 and the percentile change in mastery–
Mastery (embeddedness–Embed). The total effect is the sum of indirect and direct effects.  Panel A presents the economic significance of the effects of culture 
on leverage. Panel B presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on short-term debt. Panel C presents the economic significance of the effects of 
culture on the likelihood of having long-term debt.  Row (5) in Panel C presents the marginal effects regarding the probability of having long-term debt. 
 
Panel A: Economic Significance of the Effects of Culture on Leverage 
 
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset  
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry 
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
LEV 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Sum of 
Indirect 
Effects 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
             
Mastery             
(1) -1.2010  0.0460  -0.0610  0.0330  -0.0020  -0.0180  0.0240  0.0190  -0.0060     
(2)=(1)*Mastery -0.2868  0.0110  -0.0146  0.0079  -0.0005  -0.0043  0.0057  0.0045  -0.0014     
             
(3) 0.0480  -1.1860  -0.9950  0.8430  -12.860  0.5180  0.2960  -0.3030  6.5180   -0.0900  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.0138  -0.0130  0.0145  0.0066  0.0061  -0.0022  0.0017  -0.0014  -0.0093  -0.0108 -0.0215 -0.0323 
             
Embeddedness             
(1) -0.2690  -0.0310  0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0010  -0.0050  0.0250  0.0530  0.0020     
(2)=(1)*Embed -0.1418  -0.0163  0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0026  0.0132  0.0279  0.0011     
             
(3) 0.0480  -1.1860  -0.9950  0.8430  -12.8600  0.5180  0.2960  -0.3030  6.5180   0.0010  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.0068  0.0194  -0.0005  -0.0004  0.0068  -0.0014  0.0039  -0.0085  0.0069  0.0193 0.0005 0.0199 
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Panel B: Economic Significance of the Effects of Culture on Short-term Debt 
 
Panel C: Economic Significance of the Effects of Culture on the Likelihood of Foreign Joint Ventures’ Having Long-term Debt 
 
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset  
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry  
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
STD 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Sum of 
Indirect 
Effects 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
             
Mastery             
(1) -1.2470 0.0460 -0.0570 0.0370 -0.0020 -0.0220 0.0260 0.0170 -0.0060    
(2)=(1)*Mastery -0.2978 0.0110 -0.0136 0.0088 -0.0005 -0.0053 0.0062 0.0041 -0.0014    
             
(3) 0.0250 -0.8340 -0.9290 0.3140 -31.570 -3.103 0.4290 -0.1870 6.5230  -0.1210  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.0074 -0.0092 0.0126 0.0028 0.0151 0.0163 0.0027 -0.0008 -0.0093 0.0228 -0.0289 -0.0061 
             
Embeddedness             
(1) -0.5240 -0.0280 0.0080 0.0050 -0.0010 -0.0050 0.0280 0.0510 0.0010    
(2)=(1)*Embed -0.2762 -0.0148 0.0042 0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0026 0.0148 0.0269 0.0005    
             
(3) 0.0250 -0.8340 -0.9290 0.3140 -31.570 -3.103 0.4290 -0.1870 6.5230  -0.0370  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.0069 0.0123 -0.0039 0.0008 0.0166 0.0082 0.0063 -0.0050 0.0034 0.0319 -0.0195 0.0124 
 
Log(Firm 
Size) 
Profitability 
Asset  
Tangibility 
Asset 
Maturity 
Industry  
Concentration 
Industry 
Median 
LTD 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Marketization 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Growth 
Sum of 
Indirect 
Effects 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
             
Mastery             
(1) -0.2540 0.0430 -0.0520 0.0390 -0.0020 -0.0110 0.0240 0.0180 -0.0060    
(2)=(1)*Mastery -0.3097 0.0103 -0.0124 0.0093 -0.0005 -0.0026 0.0057 0.0043 -0.0014    
             
(3) 0.4960 -2.8990 1.7430 -6.4770 -61.760 -1.9000 -1.5920 0.5370 19.9820  0.6020  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.1536 -0.0298 -0.0216 -0.0603 0.0295 0.0050 -0.0091 0.0023 -0.0286 -0.2663 0.1438 -0.1226 
(5) Marginal effect -0.0399 -0.0077 -0.0056 -0.0157 0.0077 0.0013 -0.0024 0.0006 -0.0074 -0.0692 0.0374 -0.0318 
             
Embeddedness             
(1)  -0.0150 -0.0210 -0.0070 -0.0010 -0.0150 0.0370 0.0470 0.0010    
(2)=(1)*Embed -0.1339 -0.0079 -0.0111 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0079 0.0195 0.0248 0.0005    
             
(3) 0.4960 -2.8990 1.7430 -6.4770 -61.760 -1.9000 -1.5920 0.5370 19.9820  0.1460  
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.0664 0.0229 -0.0193 0.0239 0.0326 0.0150 -0.0311 0.0133 0.0105 0.0015 0.0770 0.0785 
(5) Marginal effect -0.0173 0.0060 -0.0050 0.0062 0.0085 0.0039 -0.0081 0.0035 0.0027 0.0004 0.0200 0.0204 
